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Recent Decisions
CIVIL PROCEDURE-COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Plaintiff sued in Common Pleas court for personal injuries arising
out of an automobile accident. Defendant answered that in a previous
action in Cincinnati Municipal Court, defendant had recovered
judgment for property damages arising out of the same accident.
Plaintiff demurred. Held, since the prior action decided the issue of
negligence, plaintiff's demurrer to the defense of estoppel or res
judicata is overruled. Vaughn v. Melzer, 46 Ohio Op. 73, 102 N.E. 2d
487 (1951).
The principal case is an excellent illustration of what the RE-
STATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS calls collateral estoppel. Section 68 (1)
reads as follows:
Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is
is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judg-
ment, the determination is conclusive between the parties in
a subsequent action on a different cause of action....
Section 70 states that both causes of action must have arisen out
of the same subject or transaction. The Ohio Supreme Court has
called this doctrine "estoppel by judgment". Hixon v. Ogg, 53 Ohio
St. 361, 42 N.E. 32 (1895); Vasu v. Kohlers Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61
N.E. 2d 707 (1945). An earlier appellate case with similar facts,
Allamong v. Falkenhof, 39 Ohio App. 515, 177 N.E. 789 (1930), might
have been cited as authority for the Vaughn v. Melzer decision.
The plaintiff, defendant in the prior action, relied upon a former
code provision in the Cincinnati municipal court act, Ohio General
Code § 1558-10, which gave the defendant the right to withhold
setting out a counterclaim when such claim was greater than the
amount for which the municipal court was authorized to enter judg-
ment. Section 1602 (f) of the new municipal court act, effective
January 1, 1952, reads "Any party defendant may at his option, with-
hold setting up any statement of counterclaim and make the same
the subject of a separate action." As a result, such a case as the
principal case, which arose under the old statutory provision, may
easily arise under the new Ohio municipal court act. See Wills, The
New Ohio Municipal Court Act, 12 OHIO ST. L. J. 314, at page
324 (1951).
The Ohio Supreme Court in Vasu v. Kohlers Inc., supra, held
that injuries to both person and property suffered by the same person
as a result of the same wrongful act were infringements of different
rights and gave rise to two distinct causes of action. Thus in Ohio a
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personal injury judgment cannot operate as a merger or bar to a
subsequent property damage action and vice versa. As the principal
case illustrates, however, issues determined in the first action may be
conclusive as to the second on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. When
the issue of negligence or contributory negligence has been determined
in an action for property damages, that determination may be con-
clusive upon ,the parties in a later suit by the same plaintiff for per-
sonal injuries based upon the same accident.
As the principal case states, public policy demands that litigation
shall not be interminable. See Scott, Colateral Estoppel By Judg-
ment, 52 HAuv. L. REv. 1 (1942). On the other hand, in cases like the
instant one, refusal to allow a later action may impose a hardship
since it may be impossible to ascertain the full extent of personal in-
juries in time to set up a counterclaim. While in theory the absence
of a counterclaim should have no effect on a jury's decision of the
issues of negligence and contributory negligence, the practical effect
of a counterclaim alleging personal injuries may be great, especially in
a close case. Thus, defense attorneys should not fail to assert a counter-
claim unless there is some overriding consideration against it.
James D. Oglevee
CONTRAMTS-RESCISSION OF BIns FOR UNILATERAL MISTAKE
The plaintiff submitted a bid to the defendant for public con-
struction work. The bid was substantially lower than it should have
been because of the plaintiff's omission of one item in calculating
the total bid price. The plaintiff discovered the error a few hours later
and so notified the defendant. Subsequently, with knowledge of the
error, the defendant accepted the original bid. The city charter pro-
vided that such bids were irrevocable, and the bid form stated that
bidders would not be released because of errors. The plaintiff sued to
cancel the bid and obtain a discharge of its bid bond. The defendant
counter-claimed for forfeiture of the bond and damages. The trial
court ruled for the plaintiff. On appeal, held, affirmed. The omission
of the one item was a material mistake, not caused by the neglect of
legal duty, which entitled the plaintiff to rescind the bid, the defendant
having knowledge of the error before its acceptance was given. M. F.
Kemper Construction Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696, 235
P. 2d 7 (1951).
As a general rule, a contract will not be reformed for unilateral
mistake. Meade v. Brown, 218 Mich. 556, 188 N. W. 514 (1922);
Rosenblum v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 270 N. Y. 79, 200 N. E. 587
(1936). Nor will such a mistake, in itself, render the transaction
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voidable. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 503 (1932); RFsTATEMiENT, RE-
STITUTION § 12 (1937). However, equitable relief by way of rescission
may be given if the mistake is a material feature of the contract, if the
enforcement of the contract as made would be unconscionable, if the
mistake was made notwithstanding ordinary diligence by the party
making it, and if the other party may be put in status quo. Frazier v.
State Bank, 101 Ark. 135, 141 S. W. 941 (1911); Geremia v. Boyarsky,
107 Conn. 387, 140 Atl. 749 (1928); 3 PoanmEoy's Equrry JURISPRUDENCE
§ 870 (5th ed. 1941).
However, in cases where the mistake has been made in a bid for
a construction contract there is a notable conflict of authority. This
is particularly true in those cases involving public contracts where
character or statutory provisions make the bids irrevocable, as in the
principal case. Generally, where relief has been given, the courts seem
disposed to consider the equitable principles expressed above. Moffett,
Hodgkins and Clarke Co. v. Rochester, 178 U. S. 373 (1900); Board of
Regents v. Cole, 209 Ky. 761, 273 S. W. 508 (1925). In those cases
denying relief, the courts appear to be guided by the objective theory
of mutual assent, emphasizing stability and definiteness in con-
tractual relations. Baltimore v. J. L. Robinson Construction Co., 123
Md. 660, 91 Atl. 682 (1914); John ]. Bowers Co. v. Milton, 255 Mass.
228, 151 N. E. 116 (1926). These underlying predispositions as to the
propriety of granting relief for unilateral mistake are as much a cause
of the conflict in the cases as are factual distinctions. A few examples
may serve to illustrate the proposition asserted. In St. Nicholas Church
v. Kropp, 135 Minn. 115, 160 N. W. 500 (1916), it was held that the
omission of an item in computing the total cost was not negligence
which would bar relief. The court in that case distinguished Stein-
meyer v. Schroeppel, 226 Ill. 9, 80 N. E. 564 (1907), where it was held
that a mistake in addition was such negligence. In Barlow v. Jones,
87 At. 649 (N. J. 1913), where an item was overlooked in determining
the final bid price, the court acknowledged that the bidder was a sick
man and that, regardless, the error was not gross negligence. But in
Grant Marble Co. v. Abbot, 142 Wis. 279, 124 N. W. 264 (1910), the
bidder was in a state of mental distress, yet the court held that his
error in basing his bid price on a building of five stories rather than
six did not entitle him to relief. The haste with which the bid was
prepared in Board of School Commissioners v. Bender, 36 Ind. App.
164, 72 N. E. 154 (1904), was a factor in excusing error. But in C. H.
Young v. Springer, 113 Minn. 382, 129 N. W. 773 (1911), the bidder
was held liable for breach of contract although error was brought about
primarily because it was calculated at a time when the bidder was
without his glasses.
That the equitable doctrine is the best means of rendering
complete justice in the individual case is hardly questionable. Con-
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versely, the facts of the principal case illuminate the possibility that
blind adherence to the legal doctrine of objective mutual assent can
result in a decision contrary to our ideas of fair play and moral justice.
The defendant had knowledge of the error well before it had accepted
the bid or had acted in reliance thereon. A court of conscience would
ignore ithe obligation placed upon it if it were to convert an innocent
omission by one party into an unconscionable gain for the other. Two
strong advocates of the objective assent theory have made an exception
of this situation in which the other party has knowledge of the mistake.
5 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 1573 (revised ed. 1937); RESTATErENT,
CONTRACTS § 503, Comment a (1932). However, the dissenting opinion
in the principal case indicates that this is a real danger rather than a
groundless apprehension on the part of the writer.
Richard G. Ison
FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY AcT-VALILITY OF RELEASE-
FEDERAL LAWv APPLIES-ISSUE OF FRAUD IS FOR THE JURY
This was an action under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
for injuries sustained during employment and alleged to have been
caused by the negligence of the defendant railroad. The defendant
pleaded a release signed by the plaintiff as a defense. The plaintiff
admitted the signing, but claimed that the release was void for fraud
in the inducement. The Ohio Supreme Court, in overruling the court
of appeals and reinstating the trial court's judgment for the de-
fendant, held that Ohio law applied as to the validity of the release
and that the issue of fraud was one for the court, but could be
submitted to the jury in an advisory capacity, their decision not being
binding on the court. On certiarori to the U.S. Supreme Court, held,
(5-4), reversed; federal law was applicable and the issue of fraud was
for the jury. The dissenting opinion concurred in the reversal, but
denied that the act requires the issue of fraud in such a case to go to
the jury Dice v. Akron, Canton, & Youngstown Rd., 342 U.S. 359
(1951).
Soon after the passage of the Federal Employer's Liability Act,
35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1939), and for many
years prior to this case, it seemed well settled that federal law, rather
than state law, should govern in the interpretation and application
of the act. The reasoning behind this was that the application
of federal law was necessary in order to avoid the defeat of a federally
declared standard by a more rigid state law and to insure uniform
application of the act throughout the country, which was so essential
to its purpose. Second Employer's Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912);
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New Orleans & N.E. Ry. v. Harris, 247 U.S. 367 (1918); Ricketts v.
Pennsylvania Rd., 153 F.2d 757 (1946); Thompson v. Camp, 163
F.2d 396 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 831 (1947); Chesapeake & 0.
Rd. v. Kuhn, 284 U.S. 44 (1931). The Ohio Supreme Court, in
several cases prior to the principal case, followed that rule. Baltimore
& 0. S.W. Rd. v. Bailey, 99 Ohio St. 312 (1919); New York, Chicago,
& St. L. Rd. v. Biermacher, 110 Ohio St. 173 (1924); Bevan v. New
York, Chicago, & St. L. Rd., 132 Ohio St. 245 (1937), cert. denied,
301 U.S. 695 (1937).
In the Ricketts case, supra, it was expressly decided that the
validity of a release under the act is a question to which federal law
should be applied. Judge Jerome Frank, in a concurring opinion, went
on to say that such releases should be treated like those of seamen under
the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 988 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 861 (1920).
Under that act the burden is on the employer to show the fairness of
the release. Garrett v. Moore McCormack, 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
But the United States Supreme Court in Callen v. Pennsylvania
Rd., 332 U.S. 625 (1948), held that the burden of proof was on the
releasor in a similar case under the Federal Employer's Liability Act.
Mr. Justice Jackson, writing the majority opinion, said that although
Judge Frank's views in the Ricketts case, supra, were appealing, it was
a matter for Congress, not the courts, and that "until the Congress
changes the statutory plan, the releases of railroad employees stand
on the same basis as the releases of others." It was upon this opinion
,that the Ohio Supreme Court based their decision that state law was
applicable. They held, in effect, that the Callen case, supra, overruled
the Ricketts case, supra, and left to be settled by state law those trans-
actions different from, but affected by, the federal act.
Apparently, however, the United States Supreme Court in the
Callen case, supra, did not intend to overrule the holding of the
Ricketts case, supra, that the validity of a release under the act was
a matter to be settled by federal law. They rejected Judge Frank's
view as to the relevance of the Jones Act, but that was as far as they
intended to go.
Had the Ohio Supreme Court applied federal law to the case, the
question of whether the issue of fraud was for the jury probably would
not have arisen. Under federal law deliberate misrepresentations of
the content of the release would render the release void, and under
Ohio law a release alleged to be void for fraud is not a bar to the
plaintiff's action and the factual question of fraud goes to the jury at
the court's discretion. Flynn v. Sharon Steel Corp., 142 Ohio St. 145
(1943).
Ohio, however, recognizes a distinction between fraud in the
factum, rendering the release void, and fraud in the inducement,
rendering it voidable. Picklesimer v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 151 Ohio
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St. 1 (1949); Meyer v. Meyer, 153 Ohio St. 408 (1950) ; 19 0. Jur. 832.
Since the plaintiff here was able to read and was not denied an op-
portunity to read the release, the court held that his failure to com-
prehend its terms, due to the fraudulent misrepresentations of the
defendant, constituted fraud in the inducement. Fraud in the in-
ducement makes the contract voidable only; therefore, under Ohio
law, the issue of fraud must be decided by the court before the
plaintiff can continue his action. Perry v. O'Neil Co., 78 Ohio St. 200
(1908); Flynn v. Sharon Steel Corp., 142 Ohio St. 145 (1943).
It was to this fragmentation of the question of fraud that the
United States Supreme Court objected. The majority of the court held
that the right to a jury was an important feature of the Federal
Employer's Liability Act and was too substantial a part of the rights
afforded by the act to permit it to be defeated by state procedure.
Brown v. Western R.R. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294 (1944). The dissent-
ing element of the court, however, pointed out that state courts are
under no duty to set up a special procedure for negligence actions
brought under a federal statute, and that states are not required to
meet the jury requirements of federal courts under the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916). The only limitation to the state court's
procedure should be that it treats actions under the act in the same
manner as other negligence actions. This the Ohio Supreme Court did.
It should be pointed out that the large majority of state juris-
dictions provide that equitable defenses to an action at law should be
decided by the court before the case goes to the jury. CLARK ON CODE
PLEADING 104 (2nd ed. 1947); WALSH ON EQUITY 117.
It was well established before this case that federal law governs
in the application of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, but the
ruling that the act requires the issue of fraud to be decided by the
jury, though contrary to the ordinary procedure of the state court in
which the action was brought, is not firmly established by this five
to four decision.
William R. Hapner, Jr.
PLEADING-JOINDER OF CONCURRENT TORTLASORS
Plaintiff, a passenger on a streetcar of the Cincinnati Street
Railway Co., was injured in a collision between the streetcar and a
truck operated by Walker. The plaintiff joined the Railway Co. and
Walker as defendants on the theory that the injuries sustained were
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by the trial court. On appeal, Held, reversed. Joinder of defendants
is proper where an injury is proximately caused by the independent
but concurrent wrongful acts of two or more persons, even though
the parties were not acting in concert in the execution of a common
purpose and the want of care of the defendants may not have been
of the same character. Meyer v. The Cincinnati Street Ry. Co., 157
Ohio St. 38, 104 N.E. 2d 173 (1952).
The early common law limited joinder of defendants to situations
where concert of action and mutual agency were present. This concert
requirement was developed before the law recognized negligent torts,
but was later carried over to apply to joinder of negligent as well as to
joinder of intentional tortfeasors.
Pgossr, TORTS 1098 (1941), and cases cited. The enactment of
the codes, with the aim of settling all questions connected with a
transaction in a single suit, would seem to dispel the view that concert
of action was still a necessary element for joinder of defendants.
Section 11255 of the Ohio General Code, a typical code provision,
states:
Any person may be made a defendant who has or claims
an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who
is a necessary party to a complete determination or settlement
of a question involved therein.
Notwithstanding the intent of the new codes, courts were at
first reluctant to dispense with the common law requirement. Few of
the opinions even mentioned the code in deciding the issue of whether
the joinder was proper. In recent years ,the vast majority of the courts
no longer require concert of action as a prerequisite for proper joinder
of defendants when their independent acts combine to produce a
single injury. Glazener v. Safety Transit Lines, 196 N.C. 504, 146 S.E.
134 (1929); McDonald v. Robinson, 207 Iowa 1293, 224 N.W. 820
(1929); Wery v. Seff, 136 Ohio St. 307, 25 N.E. 2d 692 (1940), noted
7 Oio ST. L.J. 278 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 879 (1934).
Although the rule that concert of action is not required is well
settled in most jurisdictions, there had been conflict in the cases when
the duty of care owed to the plaintiff by the defendants is of a dif-
ferent character. The majority of courts have ruled that it should
make no difference that one defendant may have the duty of exercising
ordinary care and the other defendant the duty of exercising the
highest degree of care toward the plaintiff, inasmuch as the jury can
be instructed as to the duty of each. Matthews v. Delaware L. 6& W. R.
Co., 56 N.J.L. 34, 27 At. 919 (1893) ; Carlton v. Boudar, 118 Va. 521,
88 S.E. 174,4 A.L.R. 1480 (1916); Floyd v. Williams, 54 Ga. App. 557,
188 S. E. 467 (1936).
Confusion in the Ohio law resulted from the third paragraph
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of the syllabus of Stark County Agricultural Society v. Brenner, 122
Ohio St. 560, 172 N.E. 659 (1930), which states:
Joint liability for torts only lies where wrongdoers have
acted in concert in the execution of a common purpose and
where the want of care of each is of the same character as
the want of care of the other.
Later Ohio Supreme Court cases have permitted the joinder of
concurrent tortfeasors without requiring a common purpose or the
same want of care, but these cases did not directly overrule the
Brenner case. Wery v. Seff, supra; Larson v. The Cleveland Railway,
142 Ohio St. 20, 50 N.E. 2d 163 (1943); Maloney v. Callahan, 127
Ohio St. 387, 188 N.E. 656 (1933). As a result, the Appellate Court for
the Second District held joinder improper on the authority of the
Brenner case. Seabold v. City of Dayton, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 417, 92 N.E.
2d 701 (1949).
The principal case shows unequivocally that Ohio has adopted
the position of the majority of the courts by specifically overruling the
Brenner case. This view is in conformity with Ohio Gen. Code § 11255
and is the more realistic approach to the joinder problem, in that it
will avoid multiplicity of suits and eliminate inconsistent verdicts
that may result if the defendants are sued in separate actions. Although
the principal case has taken a step forward in clarifying and liberaliz-
ing the Ohio law pertaining to permissive joinder of concurrent
tortfeasors whose actions inflict an indivisible injury to the plaintiff,
yet, it does not disturb the distinction between primary and secondary
liability in determining whether joinder is proper. Ohio has con-
sistently ruled that a party whose liability is entirely secondary cannot
be joined with a primary tortfeasor if on the face of the petition the
fact of primary and secondary liability appears. Bello v. City of
Cleveland, 106 Ohio St. 94, 138 N.E. 526 (1922); Canton Provision Co.
v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935).
Probably the most familiar case is that of joining the master and
the servant, where the only wrong charged to the master is vicarious
liability based on the employer-employee relationship. Joinder is
disallowed in this and other situations where primary and secondary
liability are involved, on the theory that there is no joint liability.
Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183, 24 N.E. 2d 705 (1940); Kniess v.
Armour and Co., 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E. 2d 734 (1938); Cowley v.




STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS-MALPRACTICE-WHEN DOES THE
CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUE
Plaintiff's petition alleged that during the course of an operation
performed by the defendant on December 8, 1942, surgical sponges
were inserted into the abdominal cavity of the plaintiff. One of the
sponges was negligently left in the wound and the incision was closed.
The plaintiff was not treated by the defendant after the operation.
On December 28, 1948, a surgeon other than the defendant performed
an operation on the plaintiff, at which time the sponge was discovered
at the site of the previous operation performed by the defendent. The
plaintiff commenced an action for malpractice on October 28, 1949.
The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer on the ground that
the action was barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed the
plaintiff's petition. OHIo GEN. CODE § 11225. The court of appeals
affirmed. On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The
plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations since
one year had elapsed after the termination of the physician-patient
relationship. De Long v. Campbell, Exrx., 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.
2d 177 (1952).
The Supreme Court of Ohio has by this decision affirmed its
prior interpretation of the Statutory limitation for malpractice.
Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902); Bowers v.
Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919); Amstutz v. King, 103
Ohio St. 674, 135 N.E. 973 (1921). The statute provides, "An action
for . . . malpractice . . . shall be brought one year after the cause
thereof accrued." OHIO GEN. CODE § 11225. As interpreted, the limita-
tion period begins to run, at the latest, on the termination of the
physician-patient relationship, whether or not the injured person
knows of the act of malpractice. The principal case illustrates the
obvious hardship on the patient when this rule is applied to a situation
where it is inherently impossible to know of the injury. The court
insists it is the function of the legislature to remedy such a hardship.
This is not a problem peculiar to Ohio since a like statutory
limitation for malpractice is found in many other jurisdictions. N.Y.
Cr. PRAC. ACT § 50 (1947); CALIF. CODE Cry. PROC. § 340, subd. 3
(1949); MAss. GEN. LAW c. 260, § 4 (1943). Most of these courts have
disregarded the hardship to the injured person and interpreted the
statutes strictly, holding that the limitation period begins to run at
the time of the wrongful act or omission, regardless of non-discovery.
Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1929); Conklin v.
Draper, 241 N.Y. Supp. 529, affd, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930) ;
Becker v. Porter, 119 Kan. 626, 240 P. 584 (1925); 144 A.L.R. 212
(1943); 54 C.J.S. 142. This majority view adopts the accepted tort
theory that a cause of action based on negligence accrues when the
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wrongful act produces injury, howsoever slight. Injury is in effect
presumed when a foreign substance is left in the wound.
California and Louisiana have adopted the "discovery doctrine"
as an exception to the general rule. It completely relieves the injured
patient from any possible hardship since the limitation period does
not commence to run until the patient discovers that a foreign sub-
stance Jias been left in his body, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered it. Ehlen v. Burrows, 51 Cal. App.
2d 141, 124 P. 2d 82 (1942); Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 555, (La.
App. 1934). Justification for this exception is based on the policy that
a person should not be precluded from suit on a cause of action that
he cannot possibly know exists.
The rule adopted in Ohio, that the limitation period begins to
run at the termination of the physician-patient relationship, is more
liberal than the majority rule, but it has been criticized for its dubious
reasoning. 16 H.Aiv. L. RFv. 454 (1903); 37 HAuv. L. REv. 272 (1923).
Nevertheless, it has found an increasing number of followers. Schmit
v. Esser, 178 Minn. 82, 226 N.W. 196 (1929); Thatcher v. De Tar, 351
Mo. 603, 173 S.W. 2d 760 (1943); Hotelling v. Walther, 169 Or. 559,
130 P. 2d 944 (1942); Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110 F. 2d 628 (1940). This
rule, unlike the majority rule, does not view the first negligent act and
the first injury produced therefrom as the cause of action; rather, the
gist of the cause of action is the continuous breach of duty in not
finding and removing the sponge. In other words, the surgeon is
guilty of malpractice throughout the entire relationship for not re-
pairing the damage he has done. A logical criticism of this theory is
that the malpractice being complained of is the initial negligence in
the operation and not the surgeon's negligence in failing to detect it
at a later time during the treatment.
The "treatment theory" adopted in Ohio was apparantly in-
tended to circumvent a harsh statute of limitations. In many cases it
has been successful, but there are still situations like the principal
case where it fails. Only the "discovery doctrine" can alleviate the
hardships that result in these situations. Since the courts will not
accept the "discovery doctrine," the legislature now holds the key to
the remedy. It would be nothing new for the General Assembly to
extend a statute of limitation by the "discovery doctrine." It was
extended to safeguard a landowner's cause of action against under-
ground trespassers. OHio GEN. CODE § 11224. The same should be done
to the malpractice statute of limitations.
It is only fair to say that an extension of the limitation period by
the "discovery doctrine" might place an undue hardship on the
surgeon, as in the principal case where the injury was not discovered
until six years after the operation. A surgeon would be compelled to
retain his records an unlimited period of time for every operation he
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performs in order to protect himself against such belated litigation.
Conceding this, it seems the law should favor those who have incurred
injury and not the wrongdoer. This is not the case of an injured
person knowing of his rights and resting on them while the evidence
becomes lost. It is rather the case of a person who has just learned of




Testatrix bequeathed her entire estate to defendant, by codicil.
It did not appear on the face of the codicil that it had been executed
in contemplation of a marriage between the testatrix and the de-
fendant. But more than a year later they were married. Ten years later
the testrix and the defendant entered into a property settlement
which was followed by a divorce. The testatrix never expressly re-
voked the codicil to her will. She died five months later. Upon her
death, her heirs at law contested the will. The Court of Common
Pleas found that the divorce coupled with a property settlement was
such a change of circumstances as would revoke a will by operation of
law. The Court of Appeals reversed, saying that the facts and cir-
cumstances were insufficient to constitute an implied revocation under
the Ohio General Code Section 10504-47. On appeal, held, affirmed.
Due to the peculiar facts of this case, it could not be conclusively
shown that there was such a change of circumstances as would effect
an implied revocation of the codicil. Codner et al. v. Caldwell et al.,
156 Ohio St. 197, 101 N.E. 2d 901 (1951).
It is an old and well established rule at common law that changes
in the domestic relations of the testator can be such as to effect a
revocation of his will by implication. 1 Page on Wills Section 507
(3d ed. 1942). This theory of revocation by operation of law has
gained wide acceptance in the United States, and has been incorporated
into the statutes of most of the states in one form or another. The
purpose of this type of revocation is to give effect to the presumedly
altered intention of the testator resulting from such changed cir-
cumstances. Some states have enacted statutes, which enumerate a
number of situations which will effect a revocation, but which fail to
include a provision for implied revocations. A distinct conflict has
arisen as to whether these enumerations exclude the implied re-
vocation. See, e.g. Re Patterson's Estate, 64 Cal. App. 643, 222 Pac.
374 (1923); Davis v. Fogle, 124 Ind. 41, 23 N.E. 860 (1890) (enumera-
tions exclude implied revocation); Fallon v. Chidester, 46 Iowa 588
(1877); Redmond v. Redmond, Texas Appeals, 127 S.W. 2d 309
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(1939) (enumerations do not exclude implied revocation). Other
states have enacted enumerative revocation statutes with a general
provision providing that "nothing herein contained shall prevent
the revocation implied by law, from subsequent changes in the con-
dition or circumstances of the testator". Mass. Gen Laws. c. 191 Sec.
8 (1932). To the same effect: Mich. Comp. Laws Sec. 702.9 (1948);
Neb. Rev. Stat. Sec. 30-209 (1943); Wis. Stat. Sec. 238.14. This latter
type of statute leaves open a broad area for judicial extension of the
doctrine of revocation by operation of law. Ohio's statute is of this
type. Ohio Gen. Code Sec. 10504-47.
Under the statutes of the large majority of states, it is unanimous-
ly held that divorce alone will not be such a change of circumstances
as to support an implied revocation. Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St.
298, 22 Am. Rep. 307 (1875); Card v. Alexander, 48 Conn. 492, 40
Am. Rep. 187 (1881); Re Arnold's Estate, 60 Nev. 376, 110 P. 2d 204
(1941); 68 C.J., W¥ills Sec. 542; Durfee, Revocation of Wills by Sub-
sequent Change in the Condition or Circumstances of the Testator,
40 Mich. L. Rev. 406 (1942). A few states do have statutes expressly
permitting divorce to effect such a revocation. e.g. Purd. Ann. Stat.
(Pa.) tit. 20, Sec. 180.7 (2). But divorce coupled with a property
settlement between the devisee and the testator is a circumstance of a
different nature. Under those statutes which contain an express pro-
vision for revocation by implication it has generally been held that a
divorce coupled with a property settlement is such a change in the
domestic relations of the testator as would justify a conclusion
by the court that the will had been impliedly revoked. Lansing v.
Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N.W. 699 (1893); Re McGraw's Estate,
228 Mich. 1, 199 N.W. 686 (1924); Donaldson v. Hall, 106 Minn.
502, 119 N.W. 219 (1909); Pardee v. Grubiss, 34 Ohio App. 474,
171 N.E. 375 (1930). These courts have felt that it is "nearer in accord
with justice and reason" that they should arrive at this conclusion.
Re Bartlett's Estate, 108 Neb. 691, 190 N.W. 869 (1922). The more
specific reasons given for the rule are: (1) that all legal and moral
obligations between the parties are discharged. Re Hall's Estate,
106 Minn. 502, 119 N.W. 219 (1909); (2) that the property settle-
ment bears a distinct resemblance to an ademption and therefore
implies a revocation. Re Bartlett's Estate, supra; and (3) that gen-
erally speaking, it is more just and reasonable to suppose that the
testator would not want to give his estate to one who had lost his love
and affection for the testator.
This rule has not been followed unanimously, for occasional
exceptional cases have found that these circumstances work no such
implied revocation. Hertrasis v. Moore, 325 Mass. 57, 88 N.E. 2d
909 (1949); Re Arnold's Estate, 60 Nev. 376, 110 P.2d 204 (1941).
The wills in those cases were executed during coverture, indicat-
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ing that those decisions are more diametrically opposed to the rule
than is the instant case, where the codicil was executed prior to
marriage. It is apparent that the principal case was decided upon
the basis of an unusual fact situation and it appears that the court
relied heavily upon these uncharacteristic facts to arrive at its decision.
It cannot be said that, with the decision of this case, Ohio
is divorcing itself from the majority view of those states whose
statutes expressly provide for implied revocation. Rather, it must
be said that the Ohio Supreme Court is very strict in its application
of the doctrine of implied revocation; and that before that doctrine
will be applied, the facts must unquestionably support the inference
that the testator intended to revoke his will. For as was said in the
Hertrais case, supra; "it would be a serious matter to invalidate a will
because of a supposed change in the intention on the part of a testator
not given formal expression by him."
William Arthur

